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I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a man with severe mental disabilities. This man is in the
custody of immigration officials seeking to deport him from the United
States. He has not worked for a number of years due to his disability and
cannot afford an attorney. The man was given a list of legal clinics that
could represent him for free, but they have too many clients and cannot
take his case. His family (if he has any) is unable to cope with his
disabilities and refuses to assist him. In any case, they cannot pay for an
attorney either. So when the man goes before the immigration judge to
plead his case, he goes alone. Our detainee cannot, of course, represent
his own interests with any efficacy. He has no knowledge of immigration
law, and his disability prevents him from fully understanding the nature
of his circumstances. Unless the court assists him in pursuing his rights,
our detainee will have no access to the full and fair proceeding to which
he is entitled. The judge assigned to our detainee’s case is extremely
overburdened.
In fact, he sees hundreds of detainees per week.1 So, when our
detainee exhibits unusual behavior, the judge does not recognize the
signs for what they are and makes no accommodations for him. As a
result, our detainee is unlawfully deported from the United States. Some
time later, our detainee—now a deportee—reaches out to the United
States government to reopen his case. Perhaps he has finally managed to
acquire an attorney. But it has now been months (perhaps years) since
the judge issued his final order. There is no legal mechanism to get his

1

An average immigration judge sees over 1500 respondents over the course of the
year. Daniel Costa, Overloaded Immigration Courts, ECON.POLICY INST. (July 24, 2014),
http://www.epi.org/publication/immigration-court-caseload-skyrocketing/.
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case reheard so far past the time of the decision. As a result, his unlawful
deportation will stand.
As the hypothetical above illustrates, immigration courts do not
automatically provide attorneys to immigration respondents.2
Consequently, only 43% of immigration respondents had legal
representation in 2010.3 It is also estimated that 15% of immigration
detainees suffer from a mental disability,4 and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (―ICE‖) performed almost 58,000 mental health
interventions in 2011.5 While precise information is unavailable on how
many unrepresented respondents suffer from a mental illness, it is not
difficult to conclude from these numbers that a judge sees several
respondents every week who are both unrepresented and have a severe
mental illness or disability.
A respondent with a mental disorder, without counsel, is at a
particular disadvantage in the immigration system,6 especially given the
presumption of competency in the immigration courts.7 His condition
may prevent him from properly communicating with the judge, which
could then prevent the judge from making accurate findings of fact. In
addition, a respondent’s mental illness may prevent him from meeting
any burdens of proof that lie with him.8 The result is that many
individuals with mental illness are likely deported pursuant to incorrect
rulings.
In an ideal world, incorrect rulings will be reheard and overturned.
However, a mentally disabled respondent likely cannot comply with case
review deadlines the same way a fully competent adult can. It may be
months or years before he has the capability, either personally or through
counsel, to ask for further review of his case. At that point, most
deadlines for getting the Board of Immigration Appeals (―BIA‖) to take a
2

8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2012) (recognizing the right to legal
representation of both noncitizens and individuals claiming US citizenship, but indicating
that counsel must be obtained at no government expense).
3
US DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Exec. Office for Immigration Review, FY 2010 Statistical
Year Book G1 (2011).
4
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & THE ACLU, DEPORTATION BY DEFAULT: MENTAL
DISABILITY, UNFAIR HEARINGS, AND INDEFINITE DETENTION IN THE U.S. IMMIGRATION
SYSTEM 3 (July 2010), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/usdeportation0710_0.pdf.
5
Detainee Health Care FY 2011, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(May 22, 2014), http://www.ice.gov/factsheets/dhc-fy11.
6
Even at the best of times, there is no guarantee that the judge will correctly apply the
law to the facts at hand, illustrating the need for review mechanisms in the first place.
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394 (1946).
7
See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 2011).
8
See generally IMMIGRATION LEGAL RE R., INADMISSIBILITY AND DEPORTABILITY
§ 1.5 (3d. ed. 2013), available at http://www.ilrc.org/files/inadmiss_deport-2013-chapte
r_01.pdf (a useful summary of burdens of proof in immigration law).
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second look at the judge’s decision have passed. Thus, immigration law
is currently in need of a framework for getting the cases of mentally
disabled respondents reheard past the deadline—in legal terms, a
framework of equitable tolling.
Equitable tolling is the doctrine that a statute of limitations will not
bar a claim if the plaintiff, despite diligent efforts, does not take action
until after the deadline has passed.9 The effect is to suspend or toll the
deadline until the impediment to filing is removed.10 Like other equity
doctrines, the purpose of equitable tolling is to ensure judicial fairness; it
recognizes that the mechanical deadlines peppering our legal authorities
must occasionally bend in the interest of justice.11 Mental illness is just
such a circumstance where mechanical rules are neither useful nor just,
and this article therefore advocates for a clear and accessible standard of
equitable tolling in the immigration courts to protect respondents with a
mental disorder.
It should be noted that while this article analyzes policies and
practices in immigration law, its principle extends beyond that field. Any
court proceeding in which a respondent may appear without counsel
contains a heightened risk that an individual with a mental illness will
not receive due relief from the court. Thus, without flexible mechanisms
for rehearing proceedings, the mentally disabled may have no
opportunity to receive the just and accurate outcome they are entitled to.

II.

BACKGROUND

As general background, the Immigration and Nationality Act
(―INA‖)12 is the primary authority on immigration law in the United
States. Alleged violations of the INA are litigated in civil administrative
courts housed within the Executive Office of Immigration Review
(―EOIR‖), a component of the Department of Justice (―DOJ‖).13 A
respondent accused of violating the INA will first go before an EOIR
immigration judge, who generally can determine removability and
adjudicate applications for relief from removal. 14 In these proceedings,
an attorney from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (―ICE‖), a
9

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 656 (10th ed. 2014).
Id.
11
See Holmberg, U.S. 392 at 396 (―Equity eschews mechanical rules; it depends on
flexibility . . . .A suit in equity may lie though a comparable cause of action at law would
be barred‖).
12
Codified under 8 U.S.C. 12 (commonly cited to the corresponding INA section).
13
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE MANUAL 1, 1-2 available at http://
www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/Practice_Manual_review.pdf#page=5
14
Id. at 4.
10

2015]

LEAVE THE DOOR OPEN

231

component of the Department of Homeland Security (―DHS‖) acts as the
federal government’s representative.15
After the immigration judge issues a ruling, the respondent then has
the opportunity to appeal to the BIA, which issues precedential
decisions.16 After the BIA, a respondent may also seek judicial review
from the courts.17 As a result of these proceedings, a respondent may be
removed against his will from the United States.18

A. Current Protections for Incompetent Respondents in the
Immigration Courts: Why Many Immigration Cases Likely
Need to be Reheard.
The INA and accompanying regulations contain limited provisions to
protect the rights of respondents who suffer from incompetency;19 for
example, the judge may not accept an admission of removability from an
incompetent respondent who appears alone.20 To determine who is in fact
incompetent, the BIA laid out a test in Matter of M-A-M-.21 According to
M-A-M-, a noncitizen is competent if he has a rational and factual
understanding of the nature and object of the proceedings, can consult
with an attorney or representative if there is one, and has a reasonable
opportunity to examine and present evidence and cross-examine
witnesses.22
The M-A-M- standard of incompetency is very similar to the general
Dusky v. United States standard of incompetency laid down by the
Supreme Court in the criminal context; that standard says that a
15

Id.
Id. at 9.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Incompetency, generally, is the ―lack of legal ability in some respect, esp. to stand
trial or to testify.‖ BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 883 (10th ed. 2014).
20
8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c) (2010).
21
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479 (BIA 2011).
22
Id. In addition, the EOIR has released the first phase of a plan to implement M-A-Min the immigration courts and to protect the rights of respondents who suffer from mental
illness; in this plan, the EOIR elaborates on the M-A-M- definition of incompetency.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PHASE I OF PLAN TO PROVIDE ENHANCED PROCEDURAL
PROTECTIONS TO UNREPRESENTED DETAINED RESPONDENTS WITH MENTAL DISORDER 2
(2013)(hereinafter PHASE 1) (stating that a competent respondent must have a rational and
factual understanding of: (a) the nature and object of the proceeding, (b) the privilege of
representation, including but not limited to, the ability to consult with a representative if
one is present; (c) the right to present, examine, and object to evidence; (d) the right to
cross-examine witnesses; and (e) the right to appeal. Furthermore, a respondent must also
have a reasonable ability to (a) make decisions about asserting and waiving rights; (b)
respond to the allegations and charges in the proceeding; and (c) present information and
respond to questions relevant to eligibility for relief).
16
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competency must have a sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and a rational
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. 23 The
notable difference between the two standards is that unlike Dusky, M-AM- requires a competent respondent to have a ―reasonable opportunity to
examine and present evidence and cross-examine witnesses.‖24 This, in
effect, makes the M-A-M- standard harder to meet, perhaps because the
immigration courts, unlike the criminal courts, do not provide statefunded counsel to indigent respondents.25
Recognizing that a respondent with limited competency will have
difficulty receiving any protections without assistance, the United States
government has taken the progressive step of providing immigration
attorneys to respondents who meet this definition of incompetency.26
Furthermore, in addition to laying down the test, M-A-M- also sets out a
framework
for
recognizing,
evaluating,
and
safeguarding
incompetency.27 But while the higher standard of incompetency in
immigration law is, in and of itself, positive for immigration respondents
who suffer from incompetency, there is no guarantee that a judge will
even recognize the respondent’s competency in the first place—and
under the M-A-M- framework, an immigration respondent is not entitled
to any special protections, including a state-funded attorney, until the
court recognizes his incompetency.28

1. Matter of M-A-M- laid out a framework for detecting
and accommodating incompetency
There are a number of barriers within the M-A-M- framework before
a respondent can be given counsel. The first challenge is detecting
incompetency.29 Because there is a presumption of competency in the
immigration courts,30 the judge must have reason to suspect that the
respondent is in fact incompetent—in legal terms, indicia of
23

Dusky v. U.S., 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479.
25
Compare 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2012) (recognizing the right to legal
representation of both noncitizens and individuals claiming US citizenship, but indicating
that counsel must be obtained at no government expense) with Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 338 (1963).
26
Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security Announce
Safeguards for Unrepresented Immigration Detainees with Serious Mental Disorders or
Conditions, THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/eoir/press
/2013/SafeguardsUnrepresentedImmigrationDetainees.html.
27
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 474-75.
28
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 477; see also PHASE I, supra note 22, at 2-3.
29
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 477.
30
Id. at 477.
24
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incompetency must be present—before the judge can perform a
competency evaluation or engage any safeguards.31
M-A-M- cites several indicators of incompetency to which the judge
should be aware.32 Some indicators are obvious, such as medical and
disability records, or direct statements from witnesses that the respondent
suffers from a mental illness.33 Other indicators, however, are more
elusory—for example, a respondent may manifest his incompetency only
by his confusion, or by his inability to stay on topic or answer
questions.34
ICE has an affirmative obligation to turn over materials that may
inform the court about the respondent’s competency, particularly where
the respondent is detained.35 Ideally, ICE will comply with this
obligation and inform the court of any mental health issues discovered
during its investigative or detention process. Nevertheless, it is inherently
dangerous to depend on an adversarial party to take action that may favor
the opposition, especially when the opposition is significantly
disadvantaged.36 The judge must be aware of this danger and should be
ready to ask questions of both parties when determining the presence of
indicia.
Once indicia are present, the second challenge is evaluating the
respondent’s competency level.37 M-A-M- lists several mechanisms a
judge may use to engage in that evaluation.38 Perhaps the most important
tool at the judge’s disposal is ordering a psychiatric evaluation, which
will likely provide the most complete information on the respondent’s
current mental health status.39 Indicia of incompetency also triggers
Matter of E-S-I-, which requires the government to serve additional
persons besides the respondent, including family or friends, who may
have knowledge about the respondent’s condition.40
31

Id.
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 479-80.
33
See id.
34
See id. at 479; see also PHASE I, supra note 22, at 4.
35
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 480.
36
See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Post-Modern, Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5 (1996).
37
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 480.
38
Id. at 480-81.
39
Id. at 481; see also Kathleen Powers Stafford & Martin O. Sellbom, Assessment of
Competence to Stand Trial, 11 FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY 412,
427 (Irving B. Weiner ed., 2d ed. 2012) (describing the benefits of psychological
evaluations to the competency evaluation process generally).
40
Matter of E-S-I-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 136, 145 (BIA 2013) (holding that where indicia of
incompetency are present, service must be made upon (1) the respondent, (2) a person
with whom the respondent resides, and (3) a relative, guardian, or friend).
32
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After the evaluation procedures are completed, the judge determines
whether the respondent is competent under the foregoing test.41 If
incompetency is found, the third challenge is to implement appropriate
safeguards.42 The EOIR instructs judges to provide unrepresented,
incompetent respondents with a ―qualified legal representative,‖43
although there are many other tools at the judge’s disposal to ensure a
respondent is given a full and fair hearing.44

2. Matter of M-A-M- is likely insufficient to protect
incompetent immigration respondents
As indicated above, some indicia of incompetency are not obvious,
and indicia may not be present at all. The judge, therefore, faces
significant obstacles in identifying signs of mental illness. He may
misinterpret indicia of incompetency as signs of poverty or lack of
education. The judge may also conclude that the respondent is
deliberately interfering with the judicial process. Even in M-A-M-, the
respondent told the judge that he had schizophrenia (emphasis added).45
Absent such obvious indicia presented to the court that case may never
have gone forward. When the court either does not have or does not
recognize indicia, DHS is left as the court’s only source of information
about the respondent’s competency. And again, it is problematic to rely
on DHS to take action that would favor their opposition.
Given the difficulties in its application, courts have rarely applied
Matter of M-A-M- in a written decision. The limited case law on the
subject likely exacerbates the problem. Judges (and counsel) are left with
little or no legal guidance on how to implement M-A-M- in the day-today cases they work with. Thus, the problem becomes cyclical. A judge
has limited ability to recognize indicia of incompetency, and implements
no safeguards. The judge then renders an inappropriate ruling, which is
almost never challenged. Even more dangerously, the lack of information
may lead the judge to the erroneous conclusion that the problems
surrounding mental illness are minor or nonexistent, so that the judge is
not on guard. The result is that there are likely numerous cases of
41

Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 481.
Id. at 481.
43
PHASE I, supra note 22, at 3
44
See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 483; see also PHASE I, supra note 22, at 15
(examples of other such safeguards may include, but are not limited to, managing the
case to facilitate the respondent’s ability to obtain legal representation and/or medical
treatment in an effort to restore competency; participation of a guardian; waiving the
respondent’s appearance; actively aiding in the development of the record, including the
questioning of witnesses; and reserving appeal rights for the respondent).
45
Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 475.
42
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respondents with a mental disorder who have been deported despite
qualifying for legal relief from removal. Thus, these respondents need a
legal mechanism to get their cases reheard.

B. How to Call a Do-Over: An Overview of Case Review
Mechanisms in Immigration Law
There are several mechanisms to rehear an immigration case in
which the judge has already ruled. The first and most obvious is an
appeal to the BIA.46 The filing deadline for an appeal is thirty days after
the judge renders his decision.47 This deadline is strictly enforced—late
filings are generally not accepted.48 Furthermore, the BIA does not
follow the mailbox rule or accept electronic filings.49 Thus, a physical
copy of the appeal must be sent via mail and received by the BIA in Falls
Church, VA50 within thirty days; otherwise, the BIA will likely consider
it to be late.
Other than an appeal, a respondent has the right by statute to file one
motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider (―MTR‖).51 Generally, a
motion to reopen is based on new facts unknown at the time of the
hearing.52 A motion to reconsider, on the other hand, is based on law.53
In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (―IIRIRA‖), Congress amended the INA to codify in statute the
Board’s authority to entertain MTRs.54 The INA sets firm deadlines for
MTRs: ninety days for a motion to reopen, and thirty days for a motion
to reconsider.55 A MTR should be filed with the entity in which
46

8 C.F.R. § 1240.15; see also 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(b) for a complete list of the types of
decisions that the BIA may review on appeal.
47
8 C.F.R § 1003.38(b); see also BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS PRACTICE MANUAL
52 (2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/BIAPracticeManual
.pdf (hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL).
48
8 C.F.R § 1003.38(b); see also PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 47.
49
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 14, 52, 126 (The only submission that the BIA
will accept electronically is the EOIR-27 (Notice of Entry of Appearance as Attorney or
Representative Before the Board of Immigration Appeals).
50
Id. at 29.
51
8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), 1229a(c)(6)(B). ―MTR‖ as used in this paper is
intended to reference both a motion to reopen and a motion to reconsider. ―MTR‖ as used
in this paper is not intended to reference the following: (1) a motion to reopen and
reconsider; (2) a joint motion to reopen; or (3) a joint motion to reconsider.
52
8 U.S.C. §§1229a(c)(7)(B), 1003.2(c).
53
8 U.S.C. §§1229a(c)(6), 1003.2(b)(1).
54
Pub.L. No. 104-208, § 304(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-593 (Sept. 30, 1996).
55
8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(1),1003.2(c)(2), 1003.23(b)(1) (deadlines for motions to
reopen before the BIA and the immigration court); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(6)(B),
1003.2(b)(2), 1003.23(b)(1) (deadlines for motions to reconsider before the BIA and the
immigration court). Note that there are also several specific exceptions to the thirty and
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jurisdiction has vested.56 Jurisdiction usually remains with the judge until
the appeal is filed with the BIA,57 however in rare cases the Board may
also hear a case by certification.58 Thus, if jurisdiction still remains with
the lower immigration court, then that court should be the one to hear the
motion. On the other hand, if an appeal has already been filed, the
motion should be filed with the BIA.
If the MTR deadlines have passed, a respondent can request either a
regulatory sua sponte MTR on the Board’s own authority59 or a
regulatory joint MTR with opposing counsel.60 These motions have no
time limits.61

C. Bending the Rules: The Basics of Equitable Tolling
Generally, to receive equitable tolling a party must establish: (1) that
he has pursued his rights diligently; and (2) some extraordinary
circumstance prevented timely filing.62 Courts have limited the doctrine’s
application to exceptional cases to ensure adversarial and judicial
fairness, and to discourage petitioners from sleeping on their rights.63

ninety day deadlines codified in both statute and regulation; see also INA
§ 240(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii), 1003.23(b)(4)(i), 1003.2(c)(3)(ii),
1003.23(b)(4)(i) (a motion to reopen to apply for asylum or withholding due to changed
country conditions has no time limits where material evidence was unavailable and could
not have been discovered at the previous proceeding); INA § 240(b)(5)(C) and 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.2(c)(3), § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii, iii) (in absentia orders); INA § 240(b)(5)(C) and 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(ac)(3), § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii), (iii)(A) (in absentia orders based on lack of
notice, or noncitizen being in custody and failing to appear through no fault of his own);
8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iii)(B) (in absentia exclusion orders); INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(iv)
(battered spouses, children, and parents).
56
Generally, jurisdiction vests with the immigration judge by filing a Notice to
Appear. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.14(a). Jurisdiction vests with the Board when an appeal is
filed. See also PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 49.
57
PRACTICE MANUAL, supra note 47, at 49-50.
58
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(c), 1003.3(d).
59
8 C.F.R. §§1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1).
60
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(c)(3)(iii), 1003.23(b)(4)(iv).
61
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(a), 1003.23(b)(1), 1003.2(c)(3)(iii),1003.23(b)(4)(iv).
62
Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 632 (2010); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544
U.S. 408 (2005).
63
See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990); see also Neves v.
Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 36 (1st Cir. 2010) (characterizing equitable tolling as a ―rare
remedy‖ rather than a ―cure all.‖); see also Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 396 (―Traditionally . . .
statutes of limitations are not controlling measures of equitable relief. Such statutes have
been drawn upon by equity solely for the light they may shed in determining that which is
decisive . . . namely, whether the plaintiff has inexcusably slept on his rights so as to
make a decree against the defendant unfair.‖); see also Burnett v. New York Central R.R.
Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965) (―Statutes of limitations are primarily designed to assure
fairness to defendants‖).
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1. A statute may be equitably tolled if it is not jurisdictional
Equitable tolling is not applied to every deadline automatically;
whether a deadline may be equitably tolled is a matter of congressional
intent.64 The Supreme Court has held that only non-jurisdictional
limitations statutes—that is, statutes that do not restrict a court’s subjectmatter or personal jurisdiction65—may be equitably tolled.66 In
Henderson v. Shinseki, the Court expressed its intention to ―bring some
discipline‖ to the frequent misapplication of the term ―jurisdictional.‖67
The Shinseki Court identified three factors to consider in determining
whether a statute is jurisdictional: (1) the plain language of the statute;
(2) the provision’s placement within the overall statute; and (3) the
characteristics of the review scheme.68
However, the Court in Shinseki reiterated that claim-processing rules
are generally non-jurisdictional.69 Claim-processing rules, like the
statutes at issue in this article, ―seek to promote the orderly progress of
litigation by requiring parties to take certain procedural steps at specified
times.‖70 Thus, there is no automatic bar against tolling claim-processing
rules.71 Nevertheless, the ultimate question is Congressional intent, and
Congress can attach jurisdictional attributes to statutes that would
ordinarily look like claim-processing rules.72

2. There is a general (but not universal) presumption that
equitable tolling shall apply to a particular statute
There is a general, rebuttable presumption that a particular statutory
deadline may be equitably tolled.73 However, the Supreme Court has
declined to apply that presumption to an agency’s internal filing
deadlines.74 Nevertheless, the absence of a presumption is not

64

Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 395 (―If Congress explicitly puts a limit upon the time for
enforcing a right which it created, there is an end of the matter‖).
65
Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197, 1202 (2011), 562 U.S. __ (2011).
66
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008).
67
Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1202.
68
Id. at 1204-06.
69
Id. at 1203.
70
Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1198.
71
See John R. Sand & Gravel Co., 552 U.S. 130, 133-34 (2008).
72
Henderson, 131 S. Ct. at 1203; see also Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S.
Ct. 817, 826-828 (2013) (holding that a statutory deadline was not jurisdictional but still
not subject to equitable tolling).
73
Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990).
74
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 827.
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determinative—equitable tolling may still apply if Congress so intends
equitable tolling to attach.75
But without the presumption, there is no bright-line on how to
evaluate Congressional intent. Though Congress may state its extent
explicitly, thereby expressing its clear intent, the Supreme Court in
Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center noted that it may consider
context, and that Congress need not ―incant magic words‖ to invoke
equitable tolling.76 Sotomayor’s concurrence advocates for consideration
of exterior factors, such as the potential prejudice to the parties, in
evaluating that context.77 While Sotomayor joins the majority’s holding
in full, she also writes separately to note that in another case, perhaps
where the party sophistication was lower, she may jump ship in the
interest of social justice.78

III.

ANALYSIS

Circuit courts have begun moving in the direction of a more
generous application of immigration deadlines.79 But although the
principles of stare decisis generally require the Board to follow circuit
court precedent in the appellate jurisdiction where a case lies,80 the BIA
has resisted some of the circuit courts’ efforts.81 Indeed, the BIA has
been so unwilling to accept instruction on some issues that they have, on
occasion, explicitly refused to follow circuit court precedent.82 The result
is an ongoing conflict between the BIA and some circuits on whether and
how a respondent may get his case reheard.
There are hints that the BIA is incorporating some flexibility into its
procedural mechanisms.83 However, the BIA has not yet laid down a
framework for an equitable tolling claim based on an unrepresented
75

Id. at 824.
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 824.
77
Id. at 829 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
78
Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. at 829.
79
See, e.g., Irigoyen-Briones v. Holder, 644 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2011); Neves v.
Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2010); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2011).
80
See Matter of Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 27 (BIA 1989) (interim decision 3105).
81
See Matter of Liadov, 23 I. & N. Dec. 990 (BIA 2006); Matter of Armendarez, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 646 (BIA 2008).
82
See, e.g., Irigoyen, 644 F.3d 943.
83
See, e.g., Matter of Kim, A035-127-124 (Oct. 12, 2011 and Jul. 30, 2012)
(unpublished BIA decisions) (the BIA granted a special motion to toll a 212(c) deadline
where the respondent filed it years late due his own gambling addiction and ineffective
assistance of counsel); but see Matter of A-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1998) (refusing
to toll the deadline for filing a motion to reopen an in absentia removal order based on
ineffective assistance of counsel).
76
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respondent’s mental illness. As shown below, the BIA generally remains
rigid in the enforcement of its deadlines.

A. Circuit Courts and the BIA are at Odds With Each Other
on Whether the Thirty Day Deadline to File a Notice of
Appeal May Be Equitably Tolled
The jurisdictional status of the thirty-day appeal deadline is
unsettled. The BIA does not accept that the thirty-day appeal deadline
may be tolled at all.84 The circuits are split.85 Thus, a respondent in a
circuit that permits equitable tolling of the appeal deadline is at an
advantage over a respondent who is in a circuit that does not, although
any relief will likely come from the circuit level rather than the BIA.
The BIA extrapolated on its position in Matter of Liadov, a case in
which the respondents missed the deadline because the post-office failed
to deliver a guaranteed overnight delivery on time.86 The BIA ruled on
this case, in favor of the government and the respondents appealed to the
Eighth Circuit.87 However, after the BIA initially ruled and the
respondents filed their appeal, the Ninth and Second Circuits both found
that the BIA’s appeal deadline could be equitably tolled where a postoffice delivers the appeal late.88 In light of this, the parties in Liadov
agreed to remand the case to the BIA for further consideration.89 But
once again, the BIA refused to accept the appeal and reiterated that it
would not accept late appeals.90 Although the BIA also recognized that it
could certify a case to itself in extraordinary cases, the BIA found that
such circumstances were not presented in the Liadov matter.91 According
to the BIA, a party should ―anticipate the possibility that the guaranteed
delivery might fail‖ rather than seeking assistance from the courts.92 The
Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that the BIA did not abuse its discretion
to hold that the thirty-day deadline is mandatory and jurisdictional.93
The BIA faced this issue again a few years later. In a Ninth Circuit
case, the post-office again failed to deliver a notice of appeal on time,
84

Matter of Liadov, 23 I. & N. Dec. 990, 993 (BIA 2006).
Compare Liadov v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1003 (8th Cir. 2008) with Irigoyen-Briones,
644 F.3d 943.
86
Matter of Liadov, 23 I. & N. Dec., at 990.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 990-91; Oh v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 611 (9th Cir. 2005); Zhong Guang Sun v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 421 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2005).
89
Matter of Liadov, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 990.
90
Id. at 993.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 992.
93
Liadov, 518 F.3d at 1009-10.
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and the BIA again called it late, ignoring the Ninth Circuit’s earlier
ruling in Oh v. Gonzales.94 The Ninth Circuit overturned the BIA’s
decision and ruled for the respondent.95 The court held that the 30-day
appeal deadline was unambiguous and non-jurisdictional.96 The court
also chastised the BIA for refusing to accept e-filings, which could
resolve the post-office issue with little inconvenience to anyone.97
As a result of this conflict between the BIA and the split circuits,
respondents are at an unfair disadvantage; if in a circuit such as the
Eighth Circuit, they have little hope for relief. If in the circuit such as the
Ninth Circuit, they still have to appeal to the BIA, where they will
presumably be denied relief. Respondents will then have to appeal again
to the appellate court before relief will be granted. At best, the
respondents’ relief will be unduly delayed or burdensome.

B. Circuit Courts and the BIA are at Odds Over How to Treat
Motions to Reopen, Especially with Regard to the PostDeparture Bar
The BIA has given little guidance on whether the statutory MTR
deadlines are jurisdictional and whether equitable tolling may apply.98
On the circuit level, however, nearly every court has ruled that motion
deadlines are non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules that can be
tolled.99 This is a positive step; but nevertheless, respondents may have
trouble getting the BIA to rehear their case, particularly to the postdeparture bar.
94

Irigoyen-Briones, 644 F.3d at 944-45.
Id. at 951.
96
Id. at 947.
97
Id. at 951.
98
One of the few times it has come up is in Matter of A-A-, where the BIA ruled that
the deadline for reopening an in absentia removal order may be tolled for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. Matter of A-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 140 (BIA 1998); 8 U.S.C.
§1154 (b)(5)(C)(i)(2014).
99
The 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th circuits have affirmatively held
that the MTR deadlines may be equitably tolled. Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 33 (1st
Cir. 2010); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130 (2d. Cir. 2000); Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen. of
the U.S, 639 F.3d 86, 90 (3d. Cir. 2011), (citing Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 406
(3d. Cir. 2005)); Kuusk v. Holder, 732 F.3d 302, 305 (4th Cir. 2013); Barry v. Mukasey,
524 F.3d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 409-10 (6th
Cir. 2004); Yuan Gao v. Mukasey, 519 F.3d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Moran
v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 496, 499-500 (8th Cir. 2005); Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d
993, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003);
Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2002); Avila-Santoyo v. Att’y Gen., 713
F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2013); see also Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 216, 220 (5th
Cir. 2008) (finding that a request to reopen based on equitable tolling is a request to
reopen on the Board’s sua sponte authority).
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In 1952, the Board’s power to entertain motions was limited by the
post-departure bar.100 In 1961, Congress made the bar statutory.101
However, Congress repealed the post-departure bar from the United
States Code in the 1996 amendments to the INA.102 The post-departure
bar, as written today, is a non-statutory federal regulation that says:
A motion to reopen or [a motion] to reconsider shall not
be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject
of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings
subsequent to his or her departure from the United
States. Any departure from the United States, including
the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject
of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings,
occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a
motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of
such motion.103
The BIA generally considers the bar to be jurisdictional; thus, it will
not hear a motion once a respondent has left the United States, whether
forcibly removed or otherwise.104 The circuits, on the other hand, have
generally found that the bar cannot apply to statutory MTRs.105 Seven
circuits reached this conclusion by applying a Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council deference analysis,106 finding that when
Congress chose not to include the post-departure bar in the 1996
amendments that made 30/90 day MTRs statutory, Congress expressed
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17 Fed.Reg. 11,469, 11,475 (Dec. 19, 1952) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 6.2 (1953)).
Act of Dept. 26, 1961, Pub.L. No. 87–301, § 5(a), 75 Stat. 650, 651–53 (1961).
102
Pub.L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009.
103
8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.2(d), 1003.23(b)(1).
104
Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 648; but see Matter of Bulnes, 25 I. & N.
Dec. 57, 58-60 (BIA 2009) (holding that a judge may hear a motion to reopen an in
absentia order post-departure where the respondent claims lack of notice).
105
Santana v. Holder, 731 F.3d 50, 55-61 (1st Cir. 2013); Luna v. Holder, 637 F.3d 85,
100 (2d Cir. 2011); Prestol-Espinal v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 653 F.3d 213, 215-18 (3d
Cir. 2011); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 330-32 (4th Cir. 2007); Carias v. Holder,
697 F.3d 257, 262-64 (5th Cir. 2012); Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 238-39 (6th Cir.
2011); Marin-Rodriguez v. Holder, 612 F.3d 591, 594 (7th Cir. 2010); Coyt v. Holder,
593 F.3d 902, 905-07 (9th Cir. 2010); Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811,
814-18 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236, 123940 (11th Cir. 2012).
106
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (A court reviewing a federal agency’s interpretation of a statute must give effect
to Congress’ unambiguously expressed intent. But if Congress is silent or its intent is
ambiguous, the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation, so long as that
interpretation is permissible).
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its intent to make the post-departure bar illegal for those MTRs.107 Three
circuits reached the same conclusion without relying on Chevron.108
These courts concluded instead that the post-departure bar conflicts with
the Supreme Court’s ruling in Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive
Eng’rs.109 According to these circuits, by promulgating the postdeparture bar the DOJ had impermissibly contracted the jurisdictional
authority that Congress had delegated to it.110
The Ninth Circuit has gone a step further. Like many of its sister
circuits, the Ninth Circuit has found that the post-departure bar cannot
apply to statutory MTRs.111 However it has also found that the postdeparture bar can only apply to a respondent who departs the United
States while proceedings are taking place (emphasis added).112 Therefore
once a respondent has been removed the post-departure no longer applies
to him because he is no longer the subject of exclusion, deportation, or
removal proceedings.113 Since the Ninth Circuit has outlawed the postdeparture bar with regard to statutory MTRs, this interpretation of the bar
would only apply to sua sponte and joint MTRs.
It is important to note that the circuit cases outlawing the postdeparture bar all arose in the context of statutory MTRs, rather than sua
sponte or joint MTRs.114 The Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits have
explicitly ruled that the bar still applies to sua sponte motions.115 No
legal body has ruled on whether the bar applies to a joint motion.
107

Santana, 731 F.3d at 55-61; Prestol-Espinal v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 653 F.3d 213,
217 (3d Cir. 2011); William v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 329, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2007); Carias,
697 F.3d at 263; Coyt, 593 F.3d at 905-07; Contreras-Bocanegra v. Holder, 678 F.3d 811,
815-16 (10th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Jian Le Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 681 F.3d 1236, 123940 (11th Cir. 2012).
108
Luna, 637 F.3d at 100; Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 238-39; Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at
594.
109
Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 558 U.S. 67 (2009).
110
Luna, 637 F.3d at 100; Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 238-39; Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at
594.
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Coyt, 593 F.3d at 905-07.
112
Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the postdeparture bar only applies to respondents who are presently in proceedings because the
drafters used the language ―is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal
proceedings.‖) (emphasis added); see also Reynoso-Cisneros v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1001,
1002 (9th Cir. 2007).
113
Lin, 473 F.3d at 982; see also Reynoso-Cisneros, 491 F.3d at 1002.
114
Perez Santana, 731 F.3d at 51; Luna, 637 F.3d at 95; Prestol-Espinal, 653 F.3d at
214; William, 499 F.3d at 330; Carias, 697 F.3d at 261; Pruidze v. Holder, 632 F.3d at
236; Marin-Rodriguez, 612 F.3d at 592-93; Coyt, 593 F.3d at 906; Contreras-Bocanegra,
678 F.3d at 813; Lin, 473 F.3d at 982-83; Jian Le Lin, 681 F.3d at 1238.
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Zhang v. Holder, 617 F.3d 650, 662 (2d Cir. 2010); Desai v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S.,
695 F.3d 267, 268 (3d Cir. 2012); Ovalles v. Holder, 577 F.3d 288, 296-97 (5th Cir.
2009).
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Despite the circuit court rulings, the BIA has tried to maintain its
historical interpretation of the post-departure bar as a blanket ban on any
MTR once a respondent has departed.116 In Matter of Armendarez, the
BIA reiterated that it does not accept post-departure MTRs at all because
it believes it does not have jurisdiction to hear the case of someone who
is not in the United States117 Although Matter of Armendarez resulted
from a case that originated in the Fifth Circuit, the BIA in Armendarez
explicitly stated that it would continue to apply the ban as it always has,
regardless of any contradictory circuit court precedent.118
In sum, like with the appellate deadline, the BIA and the split circuits
are at odds on how to treat a post-departure MTR, especially after the
deadline has passed. And again, this leaves respondents at risk of undue
prejudice in the immigration system.

C. Foul Ball: The Fifth Circuit Impermissibly Conjoins
Equitable Tolling with the Board’s Sua Sponte Power
The Fifth Circuit is the prime example of the jurisdictional quandary
that surrounds MTR deadlines. In Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, the Fifth
Circuit found that a request to file a late MTR based on equitable tolling
is essentially a request that the Board reopen the case sua sponte.119
Thus, the Fifth Circuit equates equitable tolling of MTR deadlines with
the Board’s authority to reopen a case on its own.
The Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Ramos-Bonilla has two major
implications. First, the BIA now has total discretion to grant or deny all
late filed MTRs in Fifth Circuit cases.120 Because the Board’s discretion
to grant or deny a MTR sua sponte is unreviewable, that discretion now
extends to late-filed statutory MTRs.
Second, and less obviously, the post-departure bar likely now applies
to both late-filed statutory MTRs and to sua sponte MTRs. Recall that in
116

See Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 646, 648 (BIA 2008) (―We have
reiterated that construction of the rule in an unbroken string of precedents extending over
50 years, consistently holding that reopening is unavailable to any alien who departs the
United States after being ordered removed.‖) (citing Matter of G-N-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 281,
288 (BIA 1998); Matter of Okoh, 20 I&N Dec. 864, 864-65 (BIA 1994); Matter of
Estrada, 17 I&N Dec. 187, 188 (BIA 1979), rev’d on other grounds, Estrada-Rosales v.
INS, 645 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1981); Matter of Palma, 14 I&N Dec. 486, 487 (BIA 1973);
accord Matter of Yih-HsiungWang, 17 I&N Dec. 565 (BIA 1980)).
117
Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec., at 648; but see Matter of Bulnes, 25 I. & N.
Dec. 57, 58-60 (BIA 2009).
118
Matter of Armendarez, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 653.
119
Ramos-Bonilla v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 2007).
120
Id.; see also Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 246, 249-50 (5th Cir. 2004)
(holding that the Fifth Circuit does not have the jurisdiction to review the Board’s grant
or denial of a sua sponte motion).
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the Fifth Circuit the post-departure bar still applies to a sua sponte
MTR.121 So if equitable tolling of a statutory motion is the same as a sua
sponte motion, the post-departure bar now applies to an equitably tolled
statutory motion.122 It does not, however, apply to statutory MTRs filed
on time.123
Ramos-Bonilla is very prejudicial to all Fifth Circuit respondents, but
the decision is especially troublesome for post-departure respondents due
to the new applicability of the post-departure bar to late-filed statutory
motions. This means that, in the Fifth Circuit, a post-departure
respondent’s only chance of relief past the MTR deadlines is now a joint
motion with opposing counsel. Of course, there is no guarantee that DHS
will even consider joining such a motion. The illogical result is that a
respondent who somehow manages to stay in the United States despite
an adverse ruling may have his case reheard years past the deadline,
while a respondent who was forcibly removed directly after the ruling
may have no form of relief as soon as the deadline has passed, even if he
otherwise qualifies for equitable tolling.
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in Ramos-Bonilla is unique; no other
circuit so equates equitable tolling of the MTR deadlines with a sua
sponte motion. This is not a surprise, given that the opinion’s foundation
in logic and law lacks a sound foundation. Indeed the court provides
virtually no analysis in its decision at all. The only explanation that the
Ramos-Bonilla court gives for its decision is this:
This court has held that a request for equitable tolling of
a time- or number-barred motion to reopen on the basis
of ineffective assistance of counsel is ―in essence an
argument that the BIA should have exercised its
discretion to reopen the proceeding sua sponte based
upon the doctrine of equitable tolling.‖ (emphasis
added)124
The single source that the Fifth Circuit uses to support its claim that
it has held this way before is an unpublished case, Jie Lin v. Mukasey.125
The Jie Lin court, partially cited in Ramos-Bonilla, says only this:
―[b]ecause equitable tolling is not a basis for filing an untimely or
121

Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 296-97.
Compare Ramos-Bonilla 543 F.3d at 220 with Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 296-97.
123
Compare Ramos-Bonilla 543 F.3d at 220 with Carias v. Holder, 697 F.3d 257, 26264 (5th Cir. 2012)
124
Ramos-Bonilla 543 F.3d at 220 (citing Jie Lin v. Mukasey, 286 Fed.Appx. 148, 150
(5th Cir. 2008)).
125
Ramos-Bonilla 543 F.3d at 220.
122
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numerically-barred motion under the statute or regulations, this argument
is in essence an argument that the BIA should have exercised its
discretion to reopen the proceeding sua sponte based upon the doctrine of
equitable tolling.‖126 No citation follows this quote.127 Thus, Jie Lin
simply assumes that equitable tolling cannot be a basis for filing an
untimely motion, and therefore a request for a late-filed motion must be a
sua sponte motion.128 Yet we know that in nearly every other circuit,
equitable tolling can be a basis for filing such a motion.129 But since Jie
Lin provides no explanation for its assumption and Jie Lin is the only
basis for Ramos-Bonilla, we can only speculate as to how the Fifth
Circuit reached its conclusion.
Given the confusion, the Supreme Court recently granted certiorari
in Mata v. Holder, an unreported Fifth Circuit case reaffirming RamosBonilla.130 Oral argument was heard in April of 2015.131 The Supreme
Court opinion in the coming months will hopefully shed some muchneeded light onto this very murky scenario.

IV.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Proposed Recommendations for the BIA and Circuit Courts
The following are proposed recommendations that the BIA and
Circuit Courts may implement for a more streamlined and fair process.
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Jie Lin v. Mukasey, 286 Fed.Appx. at 150.
Id.
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Id.
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Neves v. Holder, 613 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 2010); Iavorski v. INS, 232 F.3d 124, 130
(2d. Cir. 2000); Alzaarir v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S, 639 F.3d 86, 90 (3d. Cir. 2011) (citing
Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398, 406 (3d. Cir. 2005)); Kuusk v. Holder, 732 F.3d 302,
305 (4th Cir. 2013); Barry v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 409-10 (6th Cir. 2004); Yuan Gao v. Mukasey, 519
F.3d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 2008); Hernandez-Moran v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 496, 499-500
(8th Cir. 2005); Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing
Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003); Riley v. INS, 310 F.3d 1253, 1258
(10th Cir. 2002); Avila-Santoyo v. Att’y Gen., 713 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2013)
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Mata v. Holder, No. 13-60253 (5th Cir. May 16, 2014).
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Mata v. Holder, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/matav-holder/.
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1. The BIA should make it clear that case review
deadlines, including appeal deadlines and MTR
deadlines, may be equitably tolled and adopt a clear and
precise test for applying such tolling to mental
incompetency
The BIA should make it clear that both appellate deadlines and MTR
deadlines are non-jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled. As laid out
above, the circuits are already moving in that direction. The BIA should
join the circuits in this movement in the interest of ensuring that all
respondents have adequate procedural mechanisms at their disposal to
ensure a full and fair proceeding.
It is important that both appellate deadlines and MTR deadlines be
equitably tolled. Although most respondents seeking late relief likely will
not need to toll the appellate deadline if they have access to an MTR, a
respondent is only granted one motion to reopen and one motion to
reconsider.132 If a respondent has used his motion previously, he may not
have the option to utilize that mechanism at all, leaving an appeal as his
only opportunity for relief. Thus, both the appeal deadlines and the MTR
deadlines should be found to be non-jurisdictional and subject to
equitable tolling.
The BIA should also adopt a test, such as the test for incompetency
in Matter of M-A-M-, for how to apply equitable tolling to incompetency
in the immigration context. Courts have found in other contexts that
mental illness or incapacity can constitute an exceptional circumstance
justifying equitable tolling.133 This test must be clear and precise, and
must be flexible enough that it does not preclude immigration
respondents from meeting the test. The BIA should move in this
direction, as well, in order to best protect respondents with mental
disorders in immigration removal proceedings.

2. The BIA and the Circuits should remove the postdeparture bar or, alternatively, adopt a less-restrictive
interpretation of the bar
Again, the post-departure bar as currently interpreted by the BIA
prohibits any respondent from filing an MTR after leaving the United

132

8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(7)(A), 1229a(c)(6)(B)
See e.g. Barrett v. Principi, 363 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Bills v. Clark, 628 F.3d
1092 (9th Cir. 2010); Bolarwina v. Williams, 593 F.3d 226 (2d. Cir. 2010).
133
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States.134 This means that a respondent who was unable to file predeparture is prohibited from filing an MTR at all. A respondent with a
mental disorder may not be able to meet this obligation. Therefore, all
circuits and the BIA should come to the conclusion that most circuits
have already reached and outlaw the post-departure bar.
If the courts are unwilling to remove the post-departure bar entirely,
then they should find, as most circuit courts have, that the post-departure
bar does not apply to statutory MTRs135—this will provide at least one
mechanism of relief for unlawfully deported individuals with a mental
disorder.136 But remember, an individual only has the statutory right to
file one motion to reopen and one motion to reconsider.137 If you have
utilized that right, then your only other alternative is a regulatory sua
sponte motion or joint motions.138 Thus, courts should ban the postdeparture bar in its entirety instead of leaving it applicable to sua sponte
motions and potentially applicable to joint motions—this ensures that an
individual who has already used his one statutory motion to reopen or his
one statutory motion to reconsider is not precluded from bringing a postdeparture motion.
If courts must leave the post-departure bar applicable to any motion,
they should also accept the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation that the postdeparture bar only applies to respondents who leave the country while
proceedings are taking place.139 This interpretation at least permits
respondents whose proceedings have come to a conclusion to still file an
MTR because if their proceedings have been closed; the bar does not
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apply to them since they are no longer ―the subject of . . .
proceedings.‖140 Unfortunately, this interpretation means that a
respondent with a mental illness who did leave the United States before
the judge issued his final ruling may still find the bar applicable to his
case.141 Hence, removing the bar entirely is preferable.

V.

CONCLUSION

The BIA has emphasized its devotion to its historical practices in its
unwillingness to accept new policies and procedures.142 Its traditional
dependence on bright-line rules and deadlines may promote
administrative efficiency. But fairness requires flexibility, and whatever
the BIA may seek to achieve through stringent application of deadlines is
outweighed by the dangers to respondents, especially those with limited
competency. Although historical interpretations should not be rejected at
will, the law often must change to meet the growing standards of fairness
in contemporary times. This article humbly beseeches the BIA and the
judicial circuits to incorporate that fairness and flexibility in its
interpretation of deadlines and to create clear and uniform mechanisms
for granting post-decision equitable relief to respondents who suffer from
a mental illness or disability.
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